Sometimes, things actually do get cheaper.

Like cereal - adjusted for inflation, we’re actually paying about 50% less than thirty years ago.

And that’s because Philip Morris, the cigarette company, kicked off a cereal price war back in 1996.

Here’s the story, in a nutshell.

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In 1993, Marlboro had a problem: discount cigarettes.

The cheap brands had gone from 1% of the market to 36%, and Marlboro had lost share six months in a row.

So On Apr 2, the parent company Philip Morris cut the price of Marlboros by 20%.

Wall Street lost its mind. The stock dropped 23%, and about $13 billion was gone by the closing bell.

The losses spread to Coca-Cola, Heinz, and Procter & Gamble — investors worrying that if Marlboro can’t charge extra for a name, then nobody can.

But it works.

That year, Marlboro took a $2.3 billion hit to their earnings. But a year later, they were shipping 32% more cigarettes.

And most importantly, Marlboro’s share of the cigarette market kept climbing for 13 years.

It was high-risk, high-reward.

And Marlboro happened to own another brand losing market share to discount brands: Post Cereal.

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By 1995, cereal prices had gone up 90% in twelve years. Four companies owned 85% of the aisle, so when one raised prices the others followed.

Meanwhile, discount brands were 1/3rd the price, and taking more and more market share.

But nobody wanted to be the first to cut prices.

But here’s the key question: how much of each company’s profits were riding on cereal?

For Kellogg’s, cereal was 80-85% of their profits.

For General Mills, cereal was 55-60%.

For Quaker Oats, cereal was 30-35%.

For Post, cereal was 2.1%.

Guess who could afford to cut prices first?

Post cuts all 22 of its cereals by an average of 20%. (By the way, Philip Morris raised cigarette prices that same month.)

And it worked again. Not as big as Marlboro, but it stuck.

Post went from 15.5% of the cereal aisle to 17.3% over the next three years. Kellogg's dropped from 35% to 31%.

And overall, it was pretty cheap. The price cuts cost Post $260 million. But it axed about $200 million of coupons and promotions the same day.

Net cost: roughly $60 million.

But those points of market share were worth about $150 million every year.

And prices never really went back up. Today, 20 ounces of Raisin Bran runs about $4.50 at Walmart.

Thirty years of inflation, and the box costs the same.

TOGETHER WITH COMPOUND CONFERENCE

That %-of-profit chart is a lot easier to build when you can ask other operators in your sector. That's Compound.

Every February I get about 150 operators together at Sundance for three days, Feb 8–11 this time. It's all-inclusive and there are no vendor pitches.

And this year we built the hallway conversation into the schedule: small peer groups, sorted by sector, working on a real challenge from someone's business.

Use code BFCM for $1,250 off through Friday, Dec 4. That price is only good for a handful of tickets.

Put it into practice

Watch out when a competitor can afford to be cheaper than you.

So build a %-of-profit chart for the players in your field.

Because someone betting the house will likely fight fair — they don’t want to risk everything, and they need the margin as much as you do.

But someone playing with a 2% slice of their pie can take bigger swings. If things go wrong, they can fund it from something else.

Also worth asking yourself directly: how would you survive a 20% price drop?

Good luck out there.

Michael

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FREE EVENTS COMING UP

Thu Dec 3 • 12 CT / 1 ET
Year End Tax Moves for Business Owners
with Michael Girdley and Mitchell Baldridge

Wed Dec 9 • 9 CT / 10 ET
Buying a Business in 2027 (and What AI Changes About It)
with Bill D’Alessandro and Tim Ericson (Acquisition Lab)

Thu Jan 14 • 12 CT / 1 ET
Managing Humans in the AI Age
with Dave Kline and Michael Girdley

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